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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
LEGISLATION - PERSONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS - HAS THE LEGISLA-
TURE GONE FAR ENOUGH?
Upon the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the State of
New York,' the 193rd session of the New York State Legislature revised
section 308 of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules,2 thereby altering the notice
requirements for in personam jurisdiction.3 The plaintiff need no longer
attempt in-hand service before resorting to an alternate method. Sub-
stituted service in the first instance represents a significant change in New
York practice. This note will consider the new provision and evaluate other
solutions to the problems presented by traditional personal service.
In the past, New York required personal service upon the defendant
or his agent in the first instance.4 Substituted service could only be utilized
after a diligent attempt at personal in-hand service had failed.5 The "nail
and mail" substituted service provision provided for delivery to the
defendant by mailing the summons to the defendant's last known address
and either affixing the summons to the door of the defendant's place of
business, dwelling house or usual place of abode or delivery therein to a
person of suitable age and discretion. If the server found the other statu-
tory methods of service impracticable, he could move the court to devise
a further method of service which would do justice to all parties.7
The traditional methods of personal in-hand service and "nail and
mail" substituted service are retained in the revised CPLR section 308.8
1. NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT TO THE 1970 LIOSLATUm IN
RELATION TO THE CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES 32-37 [hereinafter cited as JUDICIL
CONFERENCE REPORT 1970].
2. N.Y. Civ. Pl Ac. LAW § 308 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71) [hereinafter cited as new
CPLR § 308].
3. See W. BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 275-77 (1955); F. JAMIES JR., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 621 (1965); In re Bennett's Estate, 135 Misc. 486, 238 N.Y.S. 723 (Sur. Ct.
1929).
4. N.Y. Sess. Laws [1962] ch. 308, §§ 308(1) and (2) (repealed 1970) [hereinafter
cited as former CPLR § 308].
5. Former CPLR § 308(3).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 308(4). See Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289
N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
8. New CPLR § 308(1) is identical to the in-hand service requirement of the
former § 308(1). New CPLR § 308(4) is similar to former CPLR § 308(3) with certain
exceptions. Under the former § 308(3), substituted service could be attempted only
after a diligent attempt at in-hand delivery to the defendant. There was no requirement
that the server also attempt service on an agent of the defendant. Under the new CPLR
§ 308(4), "nail and mail" substituted service must follow a diligent attempt at service
on an agent as well as the defendant. This additional requirement would appear to
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Similarly, there remains an avenue for court fashioned modes of service
if all other statutory methods are deemed impracticable.0 The recently
enacted CPLR section 308(2), however, allows a form of substituted service
in the first instance.10 The summons, although still delivered by a process
server, no longer need be delivered directly to the defendant. The new
provision states that except for matrimonial actions," personal service in
the first instance may be accomplished by
delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age
and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or
usual place of abode of the person to be served and by mailing
the summons to the person to be served at his last known ad-
dress.12
Proof of such service, including identification of the recipient, and the date,
time, and place of service, must be filed with the appropriate court 20 days
after service. The service is deemed complete 10 days after such filing.
Although this represents a departure from the traditional service
methods in New York, it is not an innovation in American law.'3 The rules
of procedure for the federal district courts and many state courts also have
provisions which allow service in the first instance to someone other than
the named party.' 4 Difficulty in locating a defendant who travels, excessive
cost, ease of evasion, and undue consumption of time comprise the primary
reasons for the widespread use of substituted service. Another prominent
consideration in New York was the frequent incidence of falsly sworn
render resort to the "nail and mail" service more difficult than under the former
CPLR § 308(3). Such a result is inconsistant with the liberalizing approach of the new
statute and should be remedied.
Excluded from the new CPLR § 308(4) is that portion of the former CPLR
§ 308(3) dealing with delivery of the summons to a person of "suitable age and dis.
cretion." This phrase is now found in the new CPLR § 308(2). Matrimonial actions are
explicitly excluded from the new version. See note 11 infra.
9. New CPLR § 308(5). This section is identical to former § 308(4) except that
service under the new substituted service § 308(2) must also be attempted prior to its
invocation. See Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1968) and note 38 infra.
10. New CPLR § 308(2). This is the crucial innovation in the new § 308.
11. New CPLR § 308(2), (3), and (4) each explicitly exclude matrimonial actions.
These specific exclusions were designed to conform the statute to the service require-
ments of the N.Y. Dom. REr.. LAw § 232 (McKinney 1964), which restricts service of
summons and complaint to personal delivery and publication only. See Root v. Root,
43 Misc. 2d 337, 250 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
12. New CPLR § 308(2).
13. See note 14 infra. It is also significant to note that such a procedure has been
considered in New York for some time. See SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT oF TiE AD-
vIsoRy CommTrrrEE ON PRACIcE AND PROCEDURE 156-58 (1958).
14. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 4(d)(1) (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-202 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-803 (1967); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223, § 31 (1958); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2703.08 (Page 1964).
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service of process affidavits which resulted from the requirement that per-
sonal service to the defendant be attempted in the first instance. As the
Judicial Conference said,
the present section 808, which allows 'substituted' service only if
attempts to serve personally have been made with due diligence,
impose such burdens on the process server, especially in the present.
circumstances of heavily increasing litigation, that abuse, in the
form of false affidavits of service, has become widespread ...
Proposed section 308 would greatly curtail this abuse by eliminating
one of its main causes: the burdensome efforts now required under
the rubric of 'due diligence' to serve process by personal service
(which may be impossible in many cases) before 'substituted' serv-
ice may be resorted to.15
During deliberations, the Judicial Conference considered the defen-
dant's constitutional right to adequate notice.16 Federal Rule 4(d)(1)17 is
similar to the New York provision and service under the former has been
held constitutional.' 8 There is, however, a difference between the two rules.
The federal rule includes the words "residing therein"; section 808(2) does
not contain such phraseology. Under the New York provision the recipient
of the summons must be at the actual place of business, dwelling place or
usual place of abode but need not reside or live therein. This difference
renders section 808(2) somewhat broader in scope than its federal counter-
part. Zuckerman v. McCulley' 9 held that service upon a servant who did
not live in defendant's house did not meet the requirements of Federal
Rule 4(d)(1). Under the present New York provision, however, such service
might well be considered to conform to the New York statutory require-
ment. Such a circumstance does not, of course, necessarily indicate that
the defendant will not receive adequate notice as required by the four-
teenth amendment.2 0 Zuckerman involved statutory, rather than constitu-
tional, interpretation. The additional New York requirement of mailing
to the defendant's last known address tends to insure that notice is "reason-
ably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action."2 ' This conclusion is fortified by the court's
finding in Entwistle v. Stone's that service under the former CPLR section
808(8) was calculated to insure notice. That provision, like the revised
CPLR section 808(2), did not include the phrase "residing therein".
15. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPoRT 1970, at 34-35.
16. Id. at 37.
17. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 4(d)(1) (1960).
18. See Jackson v. Heiser, 111 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1940).
19. 7 F.R.D. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1947), appeal dismissed, 170 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1948).
20. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
21. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
22. 53 Misc. 2d 227, 278 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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Nonetheless the combination of affixing the summons to the present place
of business, dwelling house or usual place of abode and mailing to the
last known address was deemed to fulfill the constitutional requirement.
23
The present provision does not alter the mailing requirement. It does,
however, replace the affixing provision with delivery in-hand to a person
of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling
house or usual place of abode. It would seem that actual delivery of a
summons to a person at the defendant's business or residence is as con-
stitutionally sufficient as nailing it to the defendant's door.
24
A determination that section 808(2) is constitutional does not necessarily
mean it is the most appropriate means of solving the problems enumerated
by the Judicial Conference. Other methods of service in the first instance
may be more apt to avoid excessive cost, evasion of service, undue con-
sumption of time, and affidavit battles.
The legislative session which enacted the new CPLR section 308(2)
also considered an alternative proposal for personal service in the first in-
stance by certified mail, return receipt requested.25 The -bill, which had
been considered in similar form by the Judicial Council in 1937,20 would
permit service of summons
. . . if the summons is delivered by the postman to the addressee
or to any other person qualified to receive the addressee's certified
mail in accordance with the rules and customs of the United
States post-office department, or if the addressee or his agent
refuses to receive the certified mail, and written notice of such
23. Id. See also 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 421 (1965). See generally SENATE FINANcE
AND ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS CommITrE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, at 266 (1961).
24. That the new section is calculated to adequately inform the defendant of the
proceedings does not, however, indicate that application of the provision to any par-
ticular case will be mechanical. The new provision is replete with terms requiring
judicial interpretation. State and federal cases have not been consistent. See First Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Ingerton, 207 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1953). Decisions tend to rely
on the particular fact situation of each case rather than on precise judicial definition
of such statutory terms as "dwelling place," "usual place of adobe" and "suitable age
and discretion." See Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963). Compare
DeGeorge v. Mandata Poultry Co., 196 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1961) and Joyce v.
Bauman, 11 N.J. Misc. 237, 165 A. 425 (1933).
25. S. 5879, 193d Sess. (1970); A. 632, 193d Sess. (1970). The bills were introduced
by Senator Gioffre in the N.Y.S. Senate and by Assemblyman Balleta in the N.Y.S.
Assembly on January 7, 1970. The bills were committed to the Committee on Codes in
the respective legislative bodies. The bills, to be designated § 308-a, would have amended
the former CPLR § 308.
26. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF TnE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK,
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 48, at 281-98 (1937).
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service and 'refusal together with a copy of the summons is forth-
with sent to the addressee by ordinary mail.a7
Proof of service under this proposal would be relatively simple28 and an
attempted service by this method would in no way impair one's right to
serve the summons by any other authorized method. 29
The bill's endorsement of the mails as an adequate means of giving
notice is not, in itself, new. New York has used the mails for service of
court papers 0 and for service of summons in Small Claims Courts.31 Other
states have also accepted the use of mails in certain situations.3 2 The
California Legislature, as part of a total revision of the state civil pro-
cedure, enacted a provision 33 which allows personal service in the first
instance by ordinary mail. That statute provides for an acknowledgment
27. S. 5879, 193d Sess., § l(b)(2) (1970); A. 632, 193d Sess., § l(b)(2) (1970).
28. Proof of service of summons by certified mail upon a natural person must
be made by (1) an affidavit on personal knowledge of the mailing of a true
copy of the summons by certified mail, with return receipt requested, and
(2) either (a) an official return receipt purporting to be signed by the
addressee or by a person qualified to receive the addressee's certified mail,
or (b) a notation placed by the postal authorities on the original envelope
containing the summons, that receipt thereof was refused, and an affidavit
on personal knowledge that written notice together with a copy of the
summons was, forthwith after such refusal, sent to the addressee by
ordinary mail, setting forth the facts of service and refusal. The affidavits
of mailing must set forth the time and place of mailing, the name and
address of the addressee exactly as they appeared on the envelope, and
the facts showing that such address is the address of the defendant or
other person required to be served. Proof of such service and the sum-
mons shall be filed with the clerk of the court designated in the summons
and service is complete ten days thereafter.
Id. § 1(c).
29. Id. § l(a).
30. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 2103(b)(2) (McKinney 1963).
31. N.Y.C. CvIL CT. Acr § 1803 (McKinney 1963).
32. Aimz. R v. STAT. ANN. Rule 4(e)(2)(a) (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.161
(1969); MiCH. Coaip. LAws ANN. § 600.1913 (1)(a) (1969); N.J. RuLEs 4:4-(4)(j) (1969).
England has also used the mails. See SEvicE OF PRocEss (Justices) Act, 23 & 24 Geo. 5,
ch. 42 (1933).
33. CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 415.30 (West Supp. 1969). The statute states in part:
(a) A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first
class or air mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served ....
(d) If the person to whom a copy of the summons and of the complaint are
mailed pursuant to this section fails to complete and return the acknowledge-
ment form . . . within 20 days from the date of such mailing, the party to
whom the summons was mailed shall be liable for reasonable expenses there-
after incurred in serving or attempting to serve the party by another method
See generally Note, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 1281 (1970); Note, 10 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 192
(1969).
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form 34 to be signed by the defendant or his agent as proof of receipt,
whereas the proposed section 308-a would accept a properly signed official
* postal return receipt as proof of service.
Courts have long acknowledged the accuracy of the mails. The New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides for notice by registered mail in the
case of a non-resident motorist.35 Although the Vehicle Law can be dis-
tinguished from the proposed section on the basis of applicability to non-
residents, it is significant to note how the courts have viewed that statute.
Commenting on a, substantially similar predecessor of section 253 of the
present Vehicle and Traffic Law,36 the New York Court of Appeals said
that it
provides for transmission of notice by registered mail - a method
which, with almost absolute certainty, insures delivery to the place
of address, and the return receipt of the addressee made out in
accordance with the forms provided . . . affords, at least, reason-
able certainty that the notice has been delivered to the proper
person.S7
Similarly, in certain circumstances, service by ordinary mail has been upheld
under former CPLR section 308(4).28
With certain modifications,39 the proposed section would meet constitu-
tional standards. In personam jurisdiction requires adequate notice to
34. CAL Civ. PRO. CoDE § 415.30(b) (West Supp. 1969).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF SUMMONS
This acknowledges receipt of (insert date) of a copy of the summons
and of the complaint at (insert address).
DATE
(Date this acknowledgement is executed)
(Signature of person acknowl-
edging receipt, with title if
acknowledgment is made on
behalf of another person)
35. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970).
36. N.Y. Sess. Laws (1929] ch. 54, § 52.
37. Shushereba v. Ames, 255 N.Y. 490, 494, 175 N.E. 187, 188 (1931). See Johnson
v. Bunnell, 8 App. Div. 2d 832 (2d Dep't 1959).
38. See Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1968). In allowing service by ordinary mail under former CPLR § 308(4), the Court of
Appeals provided a simple standard for any court-ordered method of service. The
defendant must be given a reasonable form of notice in light of all the circumstances,
not the least of which is the defendant's own conduct.
39. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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the defendant.40 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,41 the
United States Supreme Court stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions.42
It is upon this standard that the constitutional validity of any chosen
method of service of process is to be tested.43 The Court has considered
the use of the mails in light of this fourteenth amendment notice require-
ment. In comparing notice by mail to, notice by publication, the Court
has said that "[w]here the names and post office addresses of those affected
by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means
less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency."'4'4 The Court
further indicated its high regard for the mails when it concluded that
"[h]owever it may have been in former times, the mails today are recog-
nized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication."'4 The New
York requirement of certification further increases the likelihood of delivery
to the defendant.
There is, however, one provision of the proposed bill which may raise
due process questions:
[S]ervice shall be valid if the summons is delivered . . . to the
addressee or any other person qualified to receive the addressee's
40. See F. JAEmS JL-, supra note 3, at 612. Establishment of a court's jurisdiction
over a defendant requires a basis for assertion of the court's power over the parties as
well as adequate notice to the defendants. New CPLR § 308(2) and the proposed mail-
ing provision do not, however, pertain to the former of these two requirements.
The notice requirements in an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding are somewhat
different than those in an in personam action. In the former actions, it is the defen-
dant's property or status which is under the court's jurisdiction and upon which the
court will rule. Constructive notice by publication may be used in such actions
because "[t]he law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, in
person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform
him .. " Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877). See generally 42 AMz. JuL Process
§§ 61-62 (1942); Annot., 126 A.L.R. 664 (1940); Burton v. Davis, 259 N.C. 473, 131 S.E.2d
27 (1965); Fishman v. Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965).
41. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
42. Id. at 314.
43. Id. at 315.
44. Id. at 318. The Court was here considering an in rem action. Nonetheless, the
Court indicated a high degree of confidence in the mails. See also Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), where the Court was again faced with the question of
whether the mails should be used instead of service by publication. In concluding that
the defendant ought to have used the mails, the Court said, ". . . the city was constitu-
tionally obliged to make at least a good faith effort to give [notice of the action] per-
sonally to the appellant-an obligation which the mailing of a single letter would
have discharged." Id. at 214.
45. 339 U.S. at 319.
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certified mail, in accordance with the rules and customs of the
United States post-office department.4 6
Post office rule 39 C.F.R. 154.2 47 states that "[u]nless otherwise directed,
an addressee's mail may be delivered to his employee or a member of his
family." 48 This regulation would thus seem to allow the possibility of
delivery to a young child or someone else lacking suitable age and dis-
cretion. The problem is compounded by the scope of the mail carrier's
discretion. Although not authorized by any official regulation, a discussion
with post office officials revealed that certified mail may even be delivered
to a neighbor.49 Such possibilities need not, however, automatically in-
validate the proposed mailing provision. A slight modification would
remedy some of the suggested difficulties. The post office return receipt
form allows the sender to request that the return receipt indicate the
address to which the envelope was delivered. 0 This indication should tend
to deter the carrier's occassional practice of delivering the letter somewhere
other than the address indicated on the envelope. If the summons were
not delivered to the exact address, the return receipt would so notify the
sender who could then take appropriate action.8 1 The proposal should thus
be modified to require that the sender request notification of the exact
address to which delivery was made.
Concern over delivery of the summons to someone lacking suitable age
and discretion need not be exaggerated. That phrase represents nothing
more than the constitutional standard expounded in Mullane. Although
the courts will not be able to read that phrase into the post office regula-
tions as it would with a summons statute, 2 it is arguable that its inclusion
is not necessary. The post office has been delivering mail for over a century;
it has developed accepted methods for accomplishing that task, and
certification is deemed to be among the surest of those methods. It is not
therefore unreasonable to acknowledge such expertise and presume that
46. S. 5879, 193d Sess., § 1(h)(2) (1970); A. 632, 193d Sess., § 1(b)(2) (1970) (em-
phasis added).
47. 39 C.F.R. 154.2 (1970).
48. Id.
49. Telephone conversation with Mr. Samuel Graber, Superintendent of Postal
Services, Buffalo, New York on October 1, 1970. Mr. Graber also indicated that there
was an unwritten rule that certified letters should not be delivered to persons under
18 years of age. However, considerable weight is given to the carrier's knowledge of
the persons on his route.
50. See 39 C.F.R. 168.4(d)(2) (1970).
51. The options open to the sender at this point include another attempt at mail
service, or personal service under former CPLR § 308(1) or resort to the "nail and
mail" provision in former CPLR § 308(3).
52. Reference is made to a self-contained statute which does not depend on any
other statute or set of regulations for its implementation. The mailing provision, how-
ever, depends on the post office regulations.
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certified mail will be delivered to the addressee. As with any method of
substituted service, cases will arise in which the issue will be whether the
defendant has received actual notice. The proposed mailing provision
recognizes the possibility of non-delivery and provides for it by allowing
the defendant to invoke section 317 if he meets the requisite require-
ments.53
Since the proposed mailing procedure is arguably constitutional, the
primary issue is whether it would achieve the desired goals of service as
well as, or better than, the new CPLR section 308(2). Certainly such a pro-
cedure would help reduce the incidence of "sewer service" since it eli-
minates the necessity of personally serving the defendant. At the same time
it eliminates the cost of hiring a process server; the recently adopted CPLR
section 308(2) does not. Furthermore, a return receipt is more reliable
proof of service than an affidavit from the process server. Unlike return
receipts, affidavits are highly susceptible to attack. The use of return receipts
would tend to reduce the frequency of affidavit battles between the parties.
It was just this abuse that the new CPLR section 308 (2) hoped to curtail.54
The 193rd session of the New York State Legislature enacted a major
change in the service of process procedures. The new section 308(2) may
reduce difficulties which arose under the former in-hand service provision;
it does not, however, tend to solve the problems of excessive cost and
affidavit abuse. A close watch should be kept on the operation of the new
California provision and, at the same time, attention should be directed
toward the practical workings of the new CPLR section. If old problems
remain, the Legislature should give serious consideration to a procedure
allowing mailed service of process in the first instance.
JOHN C. SPITZMILLER
LEGISLATION - CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF
THE NEW YORK FAMILY CoupT ACT
Recently the New York Legislature has taken a fresh approach to a
most shocking and tragic problem: child abuse and neglect. The New York
Family Court Act, enacted in 1962, contemplated the problem of child
neglect through specific legislation,' but made no separate provisions for
the handling of child abuse. Consequently, throughout the statute's early
53. N.Y. Cv. PRAc. LAw § 317 (McKinney Supp. 1969). This provision allows the
defendant to reopen a judgment and defend the action if the court finds that he did
not receive notice and has %, meritorious defense.
54. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
1. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr art. 3 (McKinney 1963) (repealed 1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1963 Aar].
